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Those who are attempting to meet internal
audit requirements as heads of budgetary insti-
tutions or even as internal audit managers
amidst the wave of legislative changes of recent
years have to face serious challenges. I think
the situation is even more difficult for those
who are responsible for the development and
correct operation of the internal control sys-
tem and internal audits in local governments.
I sincerely hope the arguments supporting
my claims will be convincing and I also hope
that my work will prove useful to legislators
and as a consequence the field in question will
also see legislation based on a thought-out and
mature concept. I hope that as a result, contra-
dictions existing due to the diverging statutory
provisions applicable to local governments in
terms of their internal control systems and
internal control will be eliminated and it will be
defined clearly who’s responsible for what and
what kind of means they have to enforce legal
provisions. If the provisions are clear and
enforceable, the governing bodies governing
local governments must also hold internal audit
departments accountable in terms of efficient
operation and this will allow for great steps to
be made towards making the use of public
funds in the sub-systems of local governments
more transparent, efficient, and effective and
stronger accountability will ensue as well.
Firstly I will review the actual (or supposed)
inaccuracies and gaps of legislation, with par-
ticular attention to local government internal
audits; then I will present the conclusions
drawn from the examination performed by the
SAO of the compliance of the operation of
local government internal audits, and providing
a reason why internal audits are so important
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from aspect of audits performed by an audit
institution. At the end of my study – with
regard to the Local Government Act currently
under revision – I will make a recommendation
for the reformation of local government inter-
nal audits. As internal auditing is part of the
internal control system, therefore logically if
the internal audit does not fulfil its function,
then – in part or as a whole – the internal con-
trol system itself cannot accomplish its objec-
tives either. The renewal of internal audits goes
hand in hand with the reform of internal con-
trol systems of local governments.
CHANGES OF THE LEGISLATIVE
ENVIRONMENT 
The goal of the present paper is not to present
and analyse the last twenty years of the devel-
opment of the Hungarian financial audit sys-
tem in detail, but I feel that due to a number of
legal interpretation uncertainties and legislative
oversights, the field of internal auditing has
been controversial ever since the establishment
of local governments and the consequences of
this are rather grave. In part because the inter-
nal audit failed to uncover the irregularities and
negligence, and as a result local governments
have incurred damages; and partly because it
has not fulfilled its function, i.e. it has not con-
tributed – at least not to the extent required by
the legislator – to the development of the oper-
ation of the audited entity or to increasing its
efficiency. This latter also constitutes financial
damages for the given local government, but
we cannot disregard the drop in public confi-
dence either with respect to the operation of
the democratic institutional system.
Act LXV of 1990 on Local Governments
(ötv) entered into force on September 30, 1990,
and at the time regulations regarding financial
audits were contained in Act II of 1979 on
Public Finances (ápt) and Government Decree
No. 23/1979. (VI. 28.) MT of the Council of
Ministers on the Implementation of Act II of
1990 on Public Finances (vhr). Even at this
point it was a problem that the ápt. was not
amended at the same time the ötv. entered into
force, and in the local government system (that
is fundamentally different from the council sys-
tem) the application of the provisions of the
ápt. and the vhr. poses an almost irresolvable
problem. Legislative uncertainty was increased
by the fact that the majority of statutes on pub-
lic sector financial audits were repealed by the
National Assembly as of January 1, 1991, but
no new provisions were created to replace them
until Act XXXVIII of 1992 on Public Finances
(áht.) entered into force (July 3, 1992). The 
situation became slightly more complicated by
Act XX of 1991 on the Tasks and Scope of
Authority of the Local Governments and Their
Organs, of the Commissioners of the Republic,
and of Certain Centrally Governed Organs
(htv) which entered into force on July 23, 1991,
because as a financial management duty and
power of notaries it specified that notaries are
responsible for the financial-economic (sic!)
audits of budgetary institutions established and
maintained by the given local government.
In my opinion, interpretation problems that
still exist today in the field of local government
internal audits are the result of the initial lack of
clarity in legislation. The legislators did not think
it through that given the unique regulatory needs
an audit model should be developed which would
indeed allow the accomplishment of public
finance audit objectives – applicable to local gov-
ernments – introduced by the áht. (adherence to
regulations concerning public finances; collection
of the revenues due to the sub-systems of public
finances; economical, cost-efficient and regular
utilisation of public finance funds; efficiency and
regularity of asset management; adherence to
accounting and documentation order). The local
government is not identical to the mayor’s office
neither in a legal nor in a sociological sense. PUBLIC FINANCES 
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In my opinion, the legislator failed to review
how the duties and powers of the representative
council, the mayor and the notary should be
divided with respect to audits. ‘Legal confusion’
grew because due to the fact that— in the
absence of the well thought-out division of
duties and powers – the National Assembly
failed to create the harmonisation of the legal
institutions established by the various laws, and
as the result of different terminology, individual
interpretation gained ground which poses a
very high risk in auditing the utilisation of pub-
lic funds. This risk was increased by the fact
that without clear, detailed and enforceable reg-
ulations, it proved to be an impossible task to
ensure uniform practice in the close to 3,200
local governments, and at the same time prevent
or at least decrease the occurrence of errors that
have incurred and are still incurring damage and
losses. Government Decree 15/1999 (II. 5.) on
the Governmental, Supervisory, and Internal
Budgetary Auditing of Agencies Funded from
the Central and the Social Security Budgets
(Ber1) did not cover local government internal
audits, therefore this particular field was unreg-
ulated for years (until November 2003).
Why don’t I consider the division of auditing
duties and powers between the representative
council, the mayor and the notary sufficiently
thought-out?
Initial Situation in 1990
Pursuant to ötv provisions, local governments
are legal entities, the assets of the local govern-
ments are made up of its properties and intan-
gible assets that serve the accomplishment of
local government objectives. The representa-
tive council being responsible for the safety of
the financial management of the local govern-
ment decides on the exercising of rights attrib-
utable to the owners. Local government duties
and powers belong to the representative coun-
cil. Besides the htv. provision pursuant to
which the representative council reviews the
experiences of the audits of budgetary institu-
tions established and maintained by it on a reg-
ular basis, the representative council1 had no
duties or powers in the field of auditing and
had no direct legal opportunities for audits.
The ötv stipulates that the mayor is respon-
sible for the regularity of financial manage-
ment, represents the representative council,
ensures the execution of the budget, makes
commitments on behalf of the local govern-
ment and may also authorise other persons to
do this. In my view, the responsibility for the
regularity of financial management exists in an
uneven manner. For it is the notary’s responsi-
bility to indicate to the representative council,
the committee or the mayor any statutory
infringements detected in connection with
their decision. In the absence of such indica-
tion, the mayor’s responsibility in the field of
the execution of the budget – form a regularity
aspect – does not exist. This is reinforced by
the regulation that commitments – with certain
exceptions – can be made only after counter-
signing, and the control of adherence to regula-
tions on financial management2 is – among
other things – the countersigning officer’s
responsibility. If the countersigning officer
feels that the commitment does not infringe on
the regulation on financial management, then
he/she provides the countersignature and, in
my interpretation, assumes the responsibility
that the commitment had indeed been made in
a regular manner. As pursuant to the htv, in
local governments the notary has the power to
countersign commitments, in my opinion this
means that in reality it is the notary who is
responsible3 for the regularity of financial man-
agement. The ötv and the htv provide no tools
whatsoever for the mayor in the field of audits.
All this means that with respect to the
mayor’s office (and in the end the local gov-
ernment), the notary has the key role in the
development and operation of audits. PUBLIC FINANCES 
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According to the áht, the executing body of the
financial management of the local government
is the mayor’s office, headed by the notary,
who, among other things, is responsible for the
organisation and operation of the internal audit
of the mayor’s office (as a budgetary institu-
tion). Pursuant to Government Decree No.
96/1987. (XII. 30.) PM of the Ministry of
Finance on Supervisory Budgetary Audits and
the Internal Audit of Budgetary Institutions
that was in force at the time, the notary deter-
mined the tasks of the internal auditor in an
annual work schedule, and pursuant to the htv.
the notary was responsible for the financial-
economic audit of budgetary institutions estab-
lished and maintained by the local government.
However, with the entering into force of Ber1,
its legal background ceased to exist. The rela-
tionship of the notary and the mayor is
unevenly regulated by the ötv., as the mayor
controls the mayor’s office according to the
decisions of the representative council and
within its own local government powers.
Further Legislative Amendments
The amendment of the áht that entered into
force on November 27, 2003 stipulated as the
objective of internal audits – in contrast to the
previous regulation – that the internal audit is
an independent advisory activity that provides
material certainty, the goal of which is to devel-
op the operation of the audited entity and to
increase its efficiency. In order to achieve the
goals of the audited entity, the internal audit
must be carried out methodically and using a
system-oriented approach, and must develop
the efficiency of the risk management, audit
and control procedures of the by ‘providing
findings and proposals to the head of the budg-
etary institution’. In the case of local govern-
ments this is the notary in charge of the
mayor’s office or the head of the local govern-
ment’s budgetary institution. There is no men-
tion of a mayor or representative council.
I feel, and later on will attempt to prove my
assumption, that in the majority of local gov-
ernments the objectives of internal audits that
changed after the legislative amendment were
incorrectly interpreted, and as a result the
majority of audits featured in the internal audit
plan were not aimed at the evaluation and devel-
opment of risk management, audit and control
procedures, but were instead ‘reviser’ audits, in-
line with the former approach (petty cash, mis-
sion, fuel accounts, mobile phone use, request
for per capita subsidies, review of accounting).
In terms of the regulation of the internal audit
of local governments, Government Decree No.
193/2003. (XI. 26.) on the Internal Audit of
Budgetary Institutions4 (Ber2) that entered into
force on November 27, 2003 is considered a
milestone. Its scope as it were extended to local
government budgetary institutions, therefore
the statute provided the heads of local govern-
ment budgetary institutions with the criteria for
the requirements, on the basis of which the
heads of budgetary institutions (including
notaries at the head of mayor’s offices) can
organise and efficiently execute internal audits.
From that moment a clear opportunity opened
up for the State Audit Office to evaluate the
development and operation of internal auditing
during the audits of the financial management of
local governments. Following the entry into
force of Ber2, there were already regulations in
place, adherence to which was a requirement
that local governments could be held account-
able for – in terms of internal audits – during the
relevant audits thereof.
‘Only’ a Two-Year Delay
With respect to local governments, the new reg-
ulations introduced by the áht, pursuant to
which public finance audits must be executed
through financial management control and
internal auditing, entered into force with a two-
year delay on August 31, 2005. The amendment
of the ötv finally dealt with the audit of budget- PUBLIC FINANCES 
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ary institutions as well, as it stipulated that this
must be conducted within the framework of the
internal audit of the local government.
However, the provision according to which the
operation of a financial administration and audit
system that ensures the proper, regulated, eco-
nomical, efficient and effective utilisation of
funds available to the given local government is
the responsibility of the notary in charge of the
mayor’s office does raise some doubts. Let me
demonstrate the irrationality of the fulfilment of
this statutory requirement with the most
extreme example: besides the Budapest Mayor’s
Office, 214 budgetary institutions and 44 busi-
ness organisations take part in performing the
tasks of the Municipality of Budapest. How
could the head notary ensure the regulated, eco-
nomical, efficient and effective use of funds with
respect to the whole of the local government? 
Again I seem to be observing the contradiction
that the duties and powers of the representative
council, the mayor and the notary partly overlap,
and the notary receives exaggerated mandates,
and at the same time responsibility, however,
his/her public law status is much weaker. The fact
that the notary is responsible not only for the
operation of the financial administration and con-
trol system, but also for certain control activities
(countersigning of commitment making and
voucher issue, as well as legality controls) causes
serious problems as well. This creates a situation
of incompatibility, and in itself weakens the effi-
ciency of the internal control system.
Increasing the regulatory problems of the
aforementioned ‘triangle’ is the fact that fol-
lowing the 2005 amendment, it is the represen-
tative council which approves the annual inter-
nal audit plan. If after all the main objective of
the internal audit is to evaluate and develop the
efficiency of the risk management, audit and
control procedures of the audited entity, then
we could say that it is the person responsible
for the development and operation of the sys-
tem – the notary – who seems to be the person
most suited to approve the annual plan, and not
the ‘irresponsible’ representative council. As
the htv is still in force, pursuant to this regula-
tion the notary has the right to execute the
supervisory audit, which means that the
approval of the annual plan should also be the
notary’s task. Taking this thought further, it
leads us to the issue of the establishment and
operation of the internal control system that
covers the whole of the local government.
In this respect, however, another argument
for change is that the members of the represen-
tative council and the mayor have been directly
elected to manage the local government, exer-
cise the proprietary rights over the assets of the
local government, be held accountable by their
constituents and bear the consequences of their
decisions (always in the political sense, but
rarely in the financial sense of the word). That
is, it is not the notary who should not be
responsible for the establishment and opera-
tion of the system, but the mayor due to the
enforcement of the single-person responsibili-
ty. With respect to the council, it is difficult to
carry out the establishment and operation of
the internal control system, and enforcing
responsibility would also be complicated. 
In my opinion the legislator was not consis-
tent when – in spite of the fact that it is the rep-
resentative council that approves the annual
audit plan – it stipulated that internal control
should specify findings and recommendations
for the notary and the mayor, which the mayor
can put on the agenda of the next meeting of
the representative council. Through this solu-
tion it became clear that the utility of internal
audits is primarily apparent with respect to the
notary5 who is actually responsible for the
operation of the financial administration sys-
tem; and also that the legislator has introduced
an inexplicable filter with respect to the repre-
sentative council. The mayor is only obliged to
inform the council that ordered the audits
about the findings and recommendations of the PUBLIC FINANCES 
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internal audit if he/she feels it is justified
(which gives way to very subjective interpreta-
tion). It would have been more appropriate if
the mayor was obliged to inform the represen-
tative council in each and every case.
Regulations of the ötv concerning audits
have remained unchanged since January 1, 2007,
in spite of the fact that áht. provisions regarding
internal audits have been significantly amended
on January 1, 2009 and January 1, 2011 as well.
The regulations of the internal control system
are in many ways uninterpretable and unen-
forceable due to the amended provisions of the
ötv (the ötv does not use the term internal con-
trol system, it mentions the internal control of
local governments despite the fact that there is
no internal control in place for local govern-
ments, this is a term that is only applicable to
budgetary institutions, executive control is not
independent, according to the ötv it is not part
of the internal control system etc.). 
WHY THE OPERATION OF INTERNAL
AUDITS IS SO IMPORTANT FOR THE
STATE AUDIT OFFICE?
The 9th Congress of the International
Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions
(INTOSAI) in Lima adopted – by acclamation of
the delegates – the Lima Declaration of
Guidelines on Auditing Precepts in October
1977. The principles laid down in said declaration
are still valid today and are authoritative with
respect to the status and activity of all supreme
audit institutions – therefore the State Audit
Office of Hungary as well. The separation of
external and internal audits stood the test of time,
and the provision which states that as an external
auditor it is the supreme audit institution’s task to
review the efficiency of the internal audit contin-
ues to set the direction to follow. If the supreme
audit institution deems the operation of internal
audit successful, then – without infringing on the
general audit rights of the supreme audit institu-
tion – attempts should be made for the most
appropriate division or handover of tasks possible
and the development of cooperation.
With the growth of public consciousness, the
demand grew for users of public funds – per-
sons or institutions – to account for their activ-
ities and to be held accountable if needed. In
order to enforce this rightful need, however, the
processes and systems which are essential for
accountability must be established. To have
effective settlement, the establishment of
appropriate information, control, evaluation
and reporting systems is also necessary. The cre-
ation of statutory frameworks is the task of the
legislative organ and the government, and with-
in the given organisation the head of the organ-
isation is obliged to develop and operate the
systems, and is also responsible for the accura-
cy and adequateness of the form and content of
financial statements and other information.
One of the basic principles of audits performed
by an audit institution is that an appropriate
internal control system6 minimises the risks of
errors and irregularities. It is the audited enti-
ty’s obligation to operate internal controls that
help adherence to applicable laws and regula-
tions, the enforcement of rectitude in decision
making, the protection of resources and settle-
ment. It is the supreme audit institution’s obli-
gation to evaluate the operation of the control
system, and if controls are inadequate, insuffi-
cient or missing, the SAI must make proposals
and recommendations to resolve the problem.
THE METHOD OF THE EVALUATION OF
THE OPERATION AND COMPLIANCE 
OF INTERNAL AUDITS CONDUCTED AT
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
One of the objectives of the comprehensive
audits conducted at local governments between
2003–2006 was to evaluate whether the con- PUBLIC FINANCES 
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trols (or according to the phrasing at the time:
the established and operational internal man-
agement and regulation system, and the fulfil-
ment of internal audit functions) ensuring the
regularity of financial management adequately
helped execution. The audit at the time was
basically a regularity audit, where the State
Audit Office reviewed whether the given local
government had set up the frameworks
required for the fulfilment of internal audit
obligations and ensured the organisation and
implementation of audit assignments.
At the end of the cycle – in 2006 – the State
Audit Office7 stated that the quality of the
audit integrated into the work process had not
improved compared to previous years. The per-
formance of financial management and
process-integrates audit assignments did not
take place or were performed incompletely.
Due to the deficiencies observed there is a high
risk of the internal control systems of local
government offices not being able to prevent
or indicate material errors or irregularities. The
report stated that the situation with regard to
the performance of internal audit assignments
somewhat improved compared to previous
years, because the number of local govern-
ments that ensured the establishment and
operation of the internal audit organisation
increased; and they prepared and had approved
the internal audit manual. However, the profes-
sional quality of the execution of internal
audits, the usability and utilisation of audit
results was still unsatisfactory.
The 2006–2010 strategy8 of the State Audit
Office set as its objective the task that the SAO
transform and modernise the comprehensive
audits of local governments with significant
budgets, and contribute to the increased utili-
sation of resources received due to EU mem-
bership. A major part of the new audit pro-
gramme reviewed whether the given local gov-
ernment had put in place and operated internal
controls in the processes of budget planning,
financial management, final accounts prepara-
tion, the financial/accounting IT system and
internal auditing. The government auditing
assessed the organizational and regulatory
framework of the internal auditing of local gov-
ernments as well as whether the internal con-
trols and internal auditing had contributed to
reducing control risk by uncovering regulatory
and operational errors, initiating measures, and
by auditing the implementation of recommen-
dations.
In the interest of ensuring efficient auditing,
the State Audit Office wished to concentrate its
resources on the areas where the likelihood of
errors is the greatest and the effect of those
errors – if they do occur – is likely to be signifi-
cant. The focus of the audit work was on the
likely areas of occurrence of errors related to
audit objectives, i.e. audit-specific risks9, and it
assessed and rated the adequacy of the regulato-
ry environment; it concentrated on the possibil-
ities of the improvement of the weaknesses and
internal contradictions of this environment and
management. During audits, the auditors iden-
tified and evaluated the risks in established
internal controls in the aforementioned fields
according to the following categories:
• low: controls – if operating – provide ade-
quate protection against occurrence of
errors,
• medium: controls – if operating – provide
protection against the majority of possible
errors,
• high: controls – due to their lack of devel-
opment or incomplete development – do
not provide sufficient protection against
possible errors.
The identification and qualification of risks
within internal control related to the develop-
ment and regulation of the organisational
frameworks of internal audits has also been
performed. Auditors posed 53 questions in the
field of internal auditing, and the maximum
number of risk points was 84. During risk PUBLIC FINANCES 
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assessment local governments that scored up to
17 points received a low rating, whereas those
scoring between 18–34 points were awarded a
medium rating, and in the case of those whose
score was above 35 points, the risk was deemed
high, i.e. no controls had been established, or
their implementation was incomplete to the
extent that they did not protect against eventu-
al errors.
In addition to assessing compliance of estab-
lishment with the applicable rules, afterwards,
the State Audit Office of Hungary also
assessed the compliance of the operation and
application of the established controls, i.e.
whether the controls function appropriately, if
they are used in practice and whether they can
prevent, uncover and correct the errors occur-
ring in the course of their use. During evalua-
tion three qualifications were used: excellent,
good and weak. Compliance of the controls is
excellent if (if they are operational) – with the
exception of a few eventual minor shortcom-
ings – they comply with the regulations and the
highest level of requirements. If the number of
shortcomings was significant but it did not
compromise operative compliance and errors
prevention of the audited area, control opera-
tion was granted a ‘good’ rating. If the controls
were unable to prevent, uncover or correct
errors – because they had not been established,
or their establishment was incomplete – which,
has, in turn, put effective and reliable operation
at risk, control operation was granted a ‘weak’
rating. The assessment of the compliance of
internal auditing consisted of 52 questions and
the maximum score was 82 points. Internal
auditing was considered ‘weak’ if the local gov-
ernment only attained 49 points. The rating of
internal auditing was ‘good’ if the local govern-
ment’s score was between 50 and 66 points, and
it was ‘excellent’ if it was 67 points or more. 
Review of these areas was conducted using
the performance audit method. Performance
auditing assesses the control environment
‘retroactively’ because its set of tools enables it
to uncover the real shortcomings and weak-
nesses of the control environment and to pro-
pose forward-thinking solution recommenda-
tions. This method was also used to assess con-
trol performance10.
AUDIT EXPERIENCES OF THE STATE
AUDIT OFFICE OF HUNGARY
Between 2007–2010 the State Audit Office of
Hungary complied with its auditing obligations
mandated by the National Assembly regarding
the financial management of local govern-
ments. The Municipality of Budapest was the
only local government that did not undergo
such a comprehensive audit. This latter short-
Table 1 
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AUDITED BETWEEN 2007-2010 ACCORDING TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT TYPE
(with the exception of the Budapest Municipality) 
Name 2007 2008 2009 2010 2007–2010
(fact) (fact) (fact) (fact) total
County 5545 1 9
Town with county rank 5666 2 3
District of the capital 6665 2 3
Town 66 65 66 66 263
Large village 9241 1 6
Village 76 25 32 36 169
Total 167 109 118 119 513 PUBLIC FINANCES 
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fall was made up for by the State Audit Office
in the first half of 2011. Table 1 shows audits
conducted according to years and local govern-
ment type.
The risk of the organisational frameworks
and levels of regulation of internal auditing
among the local governments audited in 2010 –
during their 4-year term – was the best consid-
ering the ratio of low risk local governments.
The local government of every audited county
and town with county rank received a low risk
rating and there were not any local govern-
ments among the districts of Budapest that
received a high risk rating either. City local
governments are also showing signs of this
improving trend, however, 37 of the audited
local governments in villages were rated high
risk. In spite of the uncovered deficiencies, I
feel that the situation is not so bad. This evalu-
ation, however, is made slightly more
unfavourable by the fact that during the 2010
audit the Municipality of Budapest was quali-
fied as high risk. National data is shown in
Chart 1 with the exclusion of this particular
local government.
Part of the reason behind gradually improv-
ing results was probably the audit activity of
the State Audit Office, as the audit schedule
announced for four years in advance and the
identical audit plans, local governments were
aware that an audit was going to take place and
were also able to learn from the deficiencies,
irregularities found at other local governments.
As a result, they managed to correct similar
errors, after which the public sector audit
established that the organizational framework
complied with the relevant rules. Despite the
fact that the task of the central harmonisation
Chart 1
THE RISK OF THE ORGANISATIONAL FRAMEWORKS AND LEVELS OF REGULATION OF 
INTERNAL AUDIT ACTIVITY
Source: Állami Számvevõszék PUBLIC FINANCES 
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and coordination of the internal financial audit
of public finances had already been applicable
to the Minister of Finance since November 27,
2003 and that Point b), Paragraph (2), Article
121/B of the áht established that the Minister
of Finance shall draw up, publish and regularly
review the directives, methodological guide-
lines applicable to the overall system of internal
financial auditing of public finances, the imple-
mentation of this task in the field of internal
auditing was rather sluggish11, which is why it
also failed to bring any results.
The most frequently deficiencies were the
following:
• the representative councils did not deter-
mine the method of performing internal
audits;
• the notary did not ensure – provided no
internal auditor was employed – the orga-
nisation of internal auditor activity using
external resources (associations, enterprises);
• when task performance was entrusted to
an association or an enterprise, there was
no agreement concluded that would have
stipulated that internal auditing tasks shall
be managed by the association or how the
tasks determined for the internal audit
manager by legislation shall be performed; 
•  internal audit obligations had not been
determined in the rules of organisation and
operation of local government offices;
• during regulation the functional independ-
ence of internal auditors was not ensured;
•  they did not have a strategic audit plan
supported by an internal audit risk analy-
sis;
• the content of the annual audit plan did
not conform to the legal provisions;
• the annual audit plan did not conform to
the strategic plan;
• annual audit plans were not well-founded
due to the absence of rules of procedure
regarding risk management;
•  the rules of procedure for risk manage-
ment in force were not taken into account
when preparing the annual audit plan;
• the annual audit plan did not contain time-
frames for extraordinary audits; 
•  the representative councils did not
approve the annual audit plan within the
deadline set by the ötv; 
• the audit of areas deemed high risk was not
planned in the risk analysis that forms the
basis of the annual audit plan;
•  there was no audit programme prepared
for each audit approved by the internal
audit manager and in line with legal provi-
sions in terms of content; 
• the internal audit manual was not prepared
or supplemented according to the content
requirements laid down by legislation;
• they did not ensure that internal auditors
have higher education qualifications and at
least two years of professional experience.
With respect to local governments audited in
2010 being in possession of the basic audit doc-
uments (internal audit manual, strategic and
annual audit plan, audit programme), the situa-
tion is shown in Chart 2, which in my view
reflects acceptable rates. For annual audit plans,
the reason for the deficiencies observed in the
case of towns with county rank and the 
districts of the capital is that the audit plans
were not approved before the deadline set by
the ötv or the person authorised to do so. 
The management of audited local govern-
ments exhibited a very favourable attitude dur-
ing the audits. They highly appreciated the
SAO’s intention to help and its effort to pre-
vent errors. In the majority of cases they
already took the necessary measures to remedy
deficiencies during the on-site audit. In my
opinion, this allowed government auditing to
become much more efficient and effective
because as a result of voluntary measures, the
correction of irregularities was based on – for
future endeavours – the honest intention of the
management and was not the result of the for- PUBLIC FINANCES 
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mal execution of the re-commendations made
by the State Audit Office of Hungary. I think
that voluntary compliance with the law is much
more effective than any measures that in many
cases are not actually adhered to. Formal meas-
ures without true conviction greatly reduce the
added value of go-vernment auditing.
However, by the utilisation of the benefits of
cooperation and partnership, the added value
of audits is apparent immediately and is main-
tained in the long-term.
Risk identification and evaluation was fol-
lowed by the analysis of the internal audit’s
operational compliance. Surely no lengthy
explanation is required concerning the fact that
if the risk of establishing controls was high,
that is controls – due to their lack of develop-
ment or incomplete development – do not pro-
vide adequate protection against possible
errors, then logically their compliance during
operation was also weak. Local governments
also received a weak rating if the risk related to
their organisational frameworks and regulation
levels in terms of internal auditing was low or
medium but auditors, during the audits,
obtained assurance that the established con-
trols did not work.
The findings of audits conducted between
2007 and 2010 in this respect are shown in
Chart 3, which does not contain the results of
the audit of the Municipality of Budapest. The
Municipality of Budapest received a weak rat-
ing for the compliance of its internal audit
activity.
The Chart shows in detail that even though
significant progress had been made in this field
since 2007 (the proportion of local govern-
ments with weak ratings dropped from 53 to 12
percent), in 2010 internal audit activity was
inadequate in one district of the capital, as well
as seven towns and five villages. At the Szeged
mayor’s office, which is a town with town rank,
there was no actual internal audit, in contrast
with the supervised budgetary institutions and
Chart 2 
RATIO OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS WITH BASIC AUDIT DOCUMENTS
Source: Állami Számvevõszék PUBLIC FINANCES 
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business associations, which is why these latter
received an excellent rating, while the mayor’s
office a weak rating from the SAO. The chart is
not suitable for making such distinctions.
Compliance was weak in the case of the
Municipality of Budapest as well.
It was once again proven that establishing
organisational frameworks and regulating the
performance of the given activity in themselves
are not enough. It is also necessary for the
internal audit to actually work. It also became
very clear that the audit by the State Audit
Office conducted with respect to the operation
and compliance of internal control systems
does actually fulfil an actual demand and these
audits have considerable added value. 
Which were the most frequent deficiencies?
No audits were conducted with regard to
•  the establishment and operation of the
FEUVE system in line with central and
local regulations at the local government
office and local government budgetary
institutions; the economy, efficiency and
effectiveness of the operation of the finan-
cial administration and audit systems; the
management of available resources; the
protection and increasing of assets; public
procurements and public procurement
procedures; 
•  the management of available resources,
assets protection and augmentation, the
reliability of accounting statements,
reports at the business and non-profit
entities, asset management companies
ensuring the majority control over the
local government or being influenced by
the local government in question; 
• beneficiary organisations in the filed of the
proper utilisation of subsidies provided
from the local government budget for spe-
cial purposes.
Audits were not conducted according to the
audit programme content stipulated by legis-
lation, and the functional independence of
Chart 3 
COMPLIANCE OF THE EXECUTION OF INTERNAL AUDIT ACTIVITY
Source: Állami Számvevõszék PUBLIC FINANCES 
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internal auditors was not ensured during
auditing.
The content of the reports on the audit find-
ings did not conform to legal provisions, and
the follow-up of measures proposed in the
internal audit reports was not ensured.
When preparing the annual audit report, the
internal audit manager failed to evaluate the
material and personnel conditions of the inter-
nal audit within the framework of self-assess-
ment, and as a result did not make recommen-
dations to the notary on the harmonisation of
conditions with the annual plan.
The planned internal audit of local govern-
ment offices was not performed completely in
15 percent, almost one quarter of the cases.
No audit report was prepared, the procedur-
al requirements of the audit manual were not
adhered to in the case of the uncovering of acts
that provided grounds to launch criminal, mis-
demeanour, damage proceedings or disciplinary
action. 
In light of the above deficiencies, the short
statement made at the beginning of the study
that said local government internal audits are
not fulfilling their functions becomes more
understandable. We can observe that the high
number of deficiencies listed indicates that
internal auditing is not operating adequately in
local governments. One of the reasons for this
– as I have written in detail before – is that the
legislator failed to take into account the unique
features of the local government system when
it made the notary responsible for the estab-
lishment and operation of the internal control
system12 (including internal audits); but at the
same time gave the representative council the
power to approve the audit plan and to deter-
mine the number of auditors. On the other
hand, the internal control system and the mod-
ern concept of internal auditing, which forms a
part of that system was quite slow to gain
ground in the municipal sub-systems.
According to this concept, it is not restricted
to traditional financial and the related adminis-
trative control, but rather it includes a much
wider interpretation of managerial control. The
internal control system is a complex process
which is implemented by the management and
employees of an organisation and which is
developed in order to determine risks and to
provide reasonable assurance in the interest of
the organisation achieving the following objec-
tives during its mission:
•  activities (operations) should be per-
formed in a regular, ethical, economical,
efficient and effective manner;
•  its accounting obligation should be ful-
filled;
• should adhere to applicable laws and regu-
lations;
• it should protect the organisations’ funds
from losses, improper use and damages.
Given this definition, we can clearly see the
legislative error, namely that the representative
council exercising local government rights and
the mayor directly elected by the citizens have
no actual impact on the establishment and
operation of the control system (except for the
approval of the annual audit plan and the report
regarding final accounts), even though the
accomplishment of local government objec-
tives would primarily be their interest. As a
consequence they have to play a key role dur-
ing both establishment and operation. 
Based on the SAO’s audits we can state
that: the internal control system of local gov-
ernments currently does not ensure the
accomplishment of the previously mentioned
objectives and this is greatly due to the
improper operation of internal audits. If we
presume that internal audit is mainly aimed at
the evaluation of the effectiveness of the
internal control system and its objective is to
ensure that the internal control achieves the
intended result, and if it uncovers deficiencies,
these must be reported to management, then
with respect to the appropriate operation of PUBLIC FINANCES 
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internal audit we can make two (logically rel-
evant) statements. 
X If the internal control system is working
appropriately, then logically the internal audit
is also fulfilling its function.
Y If the operation of the internal control
system is incomplete or inadequate, that means
there are also problems with the internal audit,
as it did not uncover the deficiencies of the
internal control system, did not evaluate the
operation of the control system in time, even
though that was its task, or it did not draw the
correct conclusion during evaluation.
The audit findings of the State Audit Office
regarding the establishment and appropriate
operation of internal control systems support
my views, according to which in the majority
of local governments internal audits do not
prevent, uncover and point out the deficiencies
of internal control systems.
Chart 4 shows the compliance of the opera-
tion of internal controls in the processes of
budgetary planning and preparation of final
accounts based on SAO audits. Over the
course of four years, the State Audit Office
evaluated the compliance of controls in all local
governments of counties, towns with county
rank and districts of the capital, as well as 263
local governments of towns.
Though the proportion of weak-rated local
governments has gradually improved, in 2010
there were still 73 local governments that fell
into this category. The SAO performed this audit
at the Municipality of Budapest in 2011 and the
capital also received a weak rating. In the case of
a weak rating the conclusion can be drawn that
the controls are inadequate – in one of the most
important areas – to protect the funds, but this
should have been discovered by the internal audit
even before the government audit took place.
Chart 4 
THE COMPLIANCE OF THE OPERATION OF INTERNAL CONTROLS IN THE PROCESSES OF
BUDGETARY PLANNING AND PREPARATION OF FINAL ACCOUNTS
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The auditing of the compliance of the oper-
ation of technical performance certificates13
and voucher consignation14 as two ‘key con-
trols’15 also point to the inadequate protection
of funds and the inadequacy of controls in
terms of the execution of operations. Chart 5
shows the aggregated data of the audits per-
formed between 2007 and 2010. The audited
local governments are the same as the above
cited local governments. I shall present the data
of village local governments separately.
The final conclusion – the operation of the
key controls is inadequate – is similar to the
rating of the controls established for the budg-
et planning and final accounts processes, how-
ever, in this regard the controls of twice as
many local governments (138) turned out to be
weak. During a similar audit completed at the
beginning of 2011, the Municipality of
Budapest received a weak rating.
These government audit experiences also
confirm that had internal auditing worked
properly at these local governments, the estab-
lishment and operation of the internal control
system would have been examined within the
framework of such internal auditing and would
have also discovered and corrected the defi-
ciencies that the audits of the SAO later dis-
covered and established.
SUMMARY
The reader has every right to ask what the next
step is; what should and what can be done.
The audits of the State Audit Office con-
ducted between 2007–2010 pointed out that
there is an error in the system, the compli-
ance of internal audits is weak, similarly to
the compliance of controls in several key
Chart 5 
COMPLIANCE OF THE OPERATION OF TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE CERTIFICATES 
AND VOUCHER-COUNTERSIGNING
Source: Állami Számvevõszék PUBLIC FINANCES 
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areas. This is why a system-level solution is
needed.
In my view, the comprehensive reform of
existing legal regulations is unavoidable. It is
necessary that the new local government act
regulate the role and place of internal audits by
taking the unique features of the local govern-
ment system into account.16 The reformed reg-
ulations must ensure that the establishment
and operation of the internal control system
that facilitates the accomplishment of local
government objectives and accountability is
the right and obligation of the elected head of
the local government, the mayor. This solution
conforms to the international standards on
internal control systems, and therefore a prac-
tical application of a wider interpretation of
managerial control would become possible.
Since the notary is not the elected head of the
local government, the actual person in charge
of the mayor’s office would also be the mayor,
putting an end to the current uneven situation
(the mayor controls and the notary manages
the mayor’s office). As a result of the proposed
change, the mayor would be responsible for the
establishment and operation of the internal
control system, he/she would approve the
annual internal audit plan and naturally the rep-
resentative council would have the right to
order extraordinary audits. As a result, the
internal control system designed to discover,
prevent and correct the errors and deficiencies
jeopardizing the accomplishment of municipal
objectives would not be one of the responsibil-
ities of a bureaucrat – the notary —, but rather
it would be the responsibility of the mayor, the
elected head of the local government. Perhaps
this idea does not fall far from the govern-
ment’s intentions as the concept of the new
local government act includes the reinforce-
ment of the mayor’s position and the awarding
of new duties and powers. On the other hand,
some of the public administration powers
would be taken away from the notary and as a
result the mayor’s office would be in charge of
actual local government matters, which would
mean the notary’s role would decrease, but
would be able to perform control activities
much more effectively.
Through the above presented solution, the
mayor – as the leader directly elected by the cit-
izens – would get the opportunity to establish
and operate the control system that facilitates
the accomplishment of local government
objectives, and naturally he/she would also
bear the responsibility for the inadequacy of
the operation of the control system as well as
any errors and deficiencies. By thinking the
above through, we can arrive at the conclusion
that the appointment (dismissal) rights of the
notary should belong to the mayor.
Based on audit experiences, a change is
indeed required. I am certain that the solution
proposed is professionally and politically well-
founded. Without a well operating internal
control system, there cannot be a regular, eco-
nomical, efficient and effective utilisation of
public funds.
Act II of 1979 on Public Finances (ápt)
Act XXXVIII of 1989 on the State Audit Office
(Act on the State Audit Office), as of July 1, 2011
Act LXVI of 2011
Act LXV of 1990 on Local Governments (ötv)
Act XX of 1991 on the Tasks and Scope of
Authority of the Local Governments and Their
Organs, of the Commissioners of the Republic, and
of Certain Centrally Governed Organs (htv)
Act XXXVIII of 1992 on Public Finances
(áht)
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Government Decree No. 23/1979. (VI. 28.) MT
of the Council of Ministers on the Implementation
of Act II of 1979 on Public Finances (vhr)
Government Decree No. 96/1987. (XII. 30.) PM
of the Ministry of Finance on Supervisory Budgetary
Audits and the Internal Audit of Budgetary
Institutions 
Government Decree No. 15/1999. (II. 5) on the
Government, Supervisory and Internal Audits of
Central, Social Security and Public Budgetary
Institutions (Ber1)
Government Decree No. 193/2003. (XI. 26.) on
the Internal Audit of Budgetary Institutions
(Ber2).
1 I do not consider the audit opportunities of the
financial committee as regulated by Article 92 (13) of
the ötv. as such.
2 As pursuant to the áht., during financial management
the enforcement of not just regularity, but also of
economy, efficiency and effectiveness must be
ensured, this means that in this respect the notary is
responsible for ‘everything’.
3 Naturally, the mayor’s responsibility exists if, for
example, he/she makes a commitment without coun-
tersigning.
4 The preceding Ber1 did not cover local government
budgetary institutions.
5 In this case we have every right to ask: why doesn’t
the notary approve the internal audit plan.
6 The internal audit is part of the internal control sys-
tem.
7 Report No. 0705 on the Activity of the State Audit
Office of Hungary in 2006, p. 29. For more details on
the subject see Point II. 3.1 of Report No. 0726 on
the 2006 Comprehensive and Other Regularity
Audits of the Financial Management Systems of
Local and Minority Local Governments.
8 Strategy of the State Audit Office of Hungary
2006–2010, Budapest, 2006, pp. 4–6
9 Risk means the possibility of the occurrence of an
event or the failure to carry out a necessary action
which negatively impact or hinder the accomplish-
ment of the goals of the audited entity. Risk is charac-
terised by probability and significance. The result of
the occurrence of a risk event or non-compliance is, in
fact, the error (erroneous information, irregularity,
crime, inadequate operation, weak performance), the
significance of which can be characterized by it size
(value) and impact (consequence). (Audit Manual of
the State Audit Office of Hungary, Book 4, 9.4., 2008)
10 Methodology of Performance Audit – State Audit
Office of Hungary, February 7, 2008.
11 The Directive on the Internal Control Standards of
Public Finances was published in September 2009,
while the ‘Internal Control Manual’ in 2010,
12 According to the obsolete term use of the ötv [ötv
Article 92 (3) and (4)] the notary is obliged to oper-
ate a financial administration and control system
which ensures the proper, regulated, economical,
efficient and effective utilisation of funds available
to the local government; and ensures the internal
financial audit of the local government through
financial management control (financial administra-
tion and audit) and internal auditing in line with rel-
evant legislation.
13 The issuer of the technical performance certificate
must check – based on verifiable documents – before
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the expenditure is cleared for payment, and certify
based on technical considerations that the expendi-
tures have been incurred rightfully, the issuer must
also verify the relevant amounts and the rendering of
any commitments against consideration – provided
that the payment thereof or a part thereof becomes
due after consideration is rendered. [Paragraph (1),
Article 76 of Government Decree 292/2009 (XII.
19.) on the Operational Rules of Public Finances
(hereinafter referred to as Ámr)].
14 In terms of the responsibilities of the counter-
signing officer, the legislator specifies the appro-
priate application of the regulations pertaining to
the countersigner of the commitment, and sup-
plements them with two additional tasks (the
countersigning officer must verify the technical
performance certificate and the fact of the
enforcement thereof). [Paragraph (2), Article 79
of the Ámr]
15 A key control is a control, which is the strongest
among the control procedures used for the purpos-
es of averting potential errors. The effective and
consistent operation of a key control must be
testable relatively easily and they must provide pro-
tection against two or more operative errors. (Audit
Manual of the State Audit Office of Hungary, Book
5, p. 83)
16 In my view, the concept published by the Ministry
of the Interior does not contain fundamental
changes in this respect compared to the current
version.
INTOSAI GOV 9100 Guidelines for Internal
Control Standards for the Public Sector (translated
by: Endre Ákos auditor counsellor, October 2004,
Budapest)
ISSAI 1 Lima Declaration (translated by: Mrs.
Malatinszky Dr. Irén Lovas – Zoltán Gidai, August
1999). Hereinafter: ISSAI 1, Article 3
ISSAI 100 Basic Principles in Government
Auditing (translated by: Mrs. Malatinszky Dr. Irén
Lovas – Zoltán Gidai, September 1999, translation
reviewed after 2001 revision by: Endre Ákos, Miklós
Bodonyi, Mrs. Malatinszky Dr. Irén Lovas, Mrs. Péter
Németh, Mrs. Péter Szarka, Pál Tóth, first half of
2004) – hereinafter: ISSAI 100 6.c, d, g, 20, 23, 30, 31
ISSAI 300 Field Standards in Government
Auditing (translated by: Mrs. Malatinszky Dr. Irén
Lovas – Zoltán Gidai, September 1999, translation
reviewed after 2001 revision by: Endre Ákos,
Miklós Bodonyi, Mrs. Malatinszky Dr. Irén Lovas,
Mrs. Péter Németh, Mrs. Péter Szarka, Pál Tóth,
first half of 2004) – hereinafter: ISSAI 300 0.3. (c);
1.3.; 3.1.–3.3.
Online: Working paper on the new local govern-
ment act (http://www.kormany.hu/hu/dok)
LITERATURE